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Abstract
We provide a game-theoretic analysis of consensus, assuming that processes are controlled
by rational agents and may fail by crashing. We consider agents that care only about consensus :
that is, (a) an agent’s utility depends only on the consensus value achieved (and not, for example,
on the number of messages the agent sends) and (b) agents strictly prefer reaching consensus
to not reaching consensus. We show that, under these assumptions, there is no ex post Nash
Equilibrium, even with only one failure. Roughly speaking, this means that there must always
exist a failure pattern (a description of who fails, when they fail, and which agents they do
not send messages to in the round that they fail) and initial preferences for which an agent
can gain by deviating. On the other hand, if we assume that there is a distribution π on the
failure patterns and initial preferences, then under minimal assumptions on π, there is a Nash
equilibrium that tolerates f failures (i.e., π puts probability 1 on there being at most f failures)
if f +1 < n (where n is the total number of agents). Moreover, we show that a slight extension
of the Nash equilibrium strategy is also a sequential equilibrium (under the same assumptions
about the distribution π).
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1 Introduction
Consensus is a fundamental problem in distributed computing; it plays a key role in state ma-
chine replication, transaction commitment, and many other tasks where agreement among processes
is required. It is well known that consensus cannot be deterministically achieved in asynchronous
systems (9), but can be achieved in synchronous systems even if we allow Byzantine failures (see,
e.g., (16)). The assumption in all these solutions is that the reason that processes do not follow
the protocol is that they have been taken over by some adversary.
There has been a great deal of interest recently in viewing at least some of the processes as being
under the control of rational agents, who try to influence outcomes in a way that promotes their
self interest. Halpern and Teague (13) were perhaps the first to do this. Their focus was on secret
sharing and multiparty computation. Following (2; 3; 6; 12), we are interested in applying these
ideas to standard problems in game theory. And like (1; 4; 6), we are interested in what happens
when there is a mix of rational and faulty agents. For the purposes of this paper, we restrict to
crash failures. As we shall see, a number of subtle issues arise even in this relatively simple setting.
We focus on the fair consensus problem, where fairness means that the input of every agent
is selected with equal probability. Fairness seems critical in applications where we do not want
agents to be able to influence an outcome unduly. For instance, when agents must decide whether
to commit or abort a transaction, it is useful to ensure that the outcome reflects the preferences of
the agents, so that if a majority of agents prefers a particular outcome, it is selected with higher
probability. Abraham, Dolev and Halpern (2) present a protocol for fair leader election that even
tolerates coalitions of rational agents. That is, in equilibrium, a leader is elected, and each agent is
elected with equal probability. Fair leader election can be used to solve fair consensus (for example,
once a leader is elected, the consensus value can be taken to be the leader’s value). However,
the protocol of (2) assumes that there are no faulty agents. Groce et al. (12) directly provide
protocols for consensus with rational agents, but again, they do not consider faulty agents and do
not require fairness. Afek et al. (3) and Bei, Chen, and Zhang (6) provide protocols for consensus
with crash failures and rational agents. However, Afek et al.’s protocol works only under strong
assumptions about agents’ preferences, such as an agent having a strict preference for outcomes
where it learns the input of other agents, while Bei, Chen, and Zhang require that their protocol be
robust to deviations (that is, it achieves agreement even if rational agents deviate), a requirement
that we view as unreasonably strong (see Section 3). Neither of these protocols satisfy the fairness
requirement. Moreover, the protocol proposed by Afek et al. is not even an equilibrium if some
agent knows the input of other agents. As we show, this is not an accident.
To explain our result, we need to briefly recall the standard notion of ex post Nash equilibrium.
In a setting where we have an adversary, a protocol is an ex post equilibrium if no agent has any
incentive to deviate no matter what the adversary does. Formally, “no matter what the adversary
does” is captured by saying that even if we fix the adversary’s choice (so that the agents essentially
know what the adversary does), agents have no incentive to deviate. Abraham, Dolev, and Halpern
(2) provide protocols for leader election (and hence consensus) that achieve ex post Nash equilibrium
if there are no failures. Here, we show that even in synchronous systems, there is no consensus
protocol that is an ex post Nash equilibrium if there can be even one crash failure.
In the case of crash failures, the adversary can be viewed as choosing two things: the failure
pattern—which agents fail, when they fail, and which other agents they send a message to in the
round that they fail, and the initial configuration—what the initial preference of each of the agents
is. Roughly speaking, the reason that we cannot obtain an ex post Nash equilibrium is that if the
failure pattern and initial configuration have a specific form, a rational agent i can take advantage
of knowing this to increase the probability of obtaining consensus on its preferred value.
There might seem to be an inconsistency here. It is well known that we can achieve consensus
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in synchronous systems with crash failures, so it seems that we shouldn’t have any difficulty dealing
with one possibly faulty agent and one rational agent who does not follow the protocol. After all,
we can view a rational agent who deviates from the protocol as a faulty agent. But there is no
contradiction. When the agent deviates from the purported equilibrium, consensus is still reached,
just on a different value. That is, a rational agent may want to deviate so as to bias the decision,
although a consensus is still reached.
To get around our impossibility result, rather than trying to achieve ex post Nash equilibrium,
we assume that there is some distribution π on contexts: pairs (F,~v) consisting of a failure pattern
F and an initial configuration ~v. We show that under appropriate assumptions about π, if agents
care only about consensus—specifically, if (a) an agent’s utility depends only on the consensus value
achieved (and not, for example, on the number of messages the agent sends) and (b) agents strictly
prefer reaching consensus to not reaching consensus—then there is a Nash equilibrium that tolerates
up to f failures, as long as f + 1 < n, where n is the total number of agents. Specifically, we make
two assumptions about π, namely, we assume that π supports reachability and is uniform. Roughly
speaking, we say that π supports reachability if it attributes small probability to particular failure
patterns that prevent information from one agent reaching an agent that has not crashed by the
end of the protocol; we say that π is uniform if it attributes equal probability to equivalent failures
of different agents. We believe that these assumptions apply in many practical systems; we discuss
this further in Section 4.
Our Nash equilibrium strategy relies on “threats”; the threat that there will be no consensus
if an agent deviates (and is caught). There might be some concern that these are empty threats,
which will never be carried out. The notion of sequential equilibrium (15) is intended to deal
with empty threats. Roughly speaking, a strategy is a sequential equilibrium if all agents are best
responding to what the others are doing even off the equilibrium path. We generalize sequential
equilibrium to our setting, where there might be failures, and show that the strategy that gives a
Nash equilibrium can be slightly extended to give a sequential equilibrium that tolerates up to f
failures.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the model that we are
using. Our main technical results on Nash equilibrium and sequential equilibrium are given in
Section 3. We conclude with some discussion of the assumptions in Section 4.
2 Model
We consider a synchronous message-passing system with n agents and reliable communication
channels between each pair of agents. Time is divided into synchronous rounds. Each round is
divided into a send phase, where agents send messages to other agents, a receive phase, where
agents receive messages sent by other agents in the send phase of that round, and an update phase,
where agents update the value of variables based on what they have sent and received. We denote
by N the set of agents and assume that they have commonly-known identifiers in {0, . . . , n − 1}.
Round m takes place between time m and time m+ 1.
We now formalize the notion of run. We take a round-m history for agent i to be a sequence of
form (v, t1, . . . , tm−1), where v is agent i’s initial preference and tj has the form (sj , rj, dj), where
sj is the set of messages that i sent in round j tagged by who they were sent to, rj is the set
of messages that i received in round j tagged by who they were sent by, and dj ∈ {λ} ∪ V is i’s
decision (where λ denotes that no decision has been made yet and V is the set of decision values).
A global (round-m) history has the form (h1, . . . , hn) where hi is a round-m history, if j receives a
message m from i in round m′ of hj , then i sends m to j in round m
′ in history hi. A run r is a
function from time (which ranges over the natural numbers) to global histories such that (a) r(m)
is a global round-m history and (b) if m < m′, then for each agent i, i’s history in r(m) is a prefix
2
of i’s history in r(m′).
Agents are either correct or faulty in a run. An agent fails only by crashing. If it crashes in
round m of run r, then it may send a message to some subset of agents in round m, but from
then on, it sends no further messages. We assume that all messages sent are received in the round
in which they are sent. Thus, we take a failure f of agent i to be a tuple (i,m,A), where m is a
round number (intuitively, the round at which i crashes) and A is a set of agents (intuitively, the
set of agents j to whom i can send a message before it fails). We assume that if m > 1, then A
is non-empty, so that i sends a message to at least one agent in round m if i fails in round m.
(Intuitively, if m > 1, we are identifying the failure pattern where i crashes in round m and sends
no message with the failure pattern where i crashes in round m− 1 and sends messages to all the
agents.) A failure pattern F is a set of failures of distinct agents i. A run r has context (F,~v) if (a)
~v describes the initial preferences of the agents in r, (b) if (i,m,A) ∈ F , then i sends all messages
according to its protocol in each round m′ < m, sends no messages in each round m′ > m, and
sends messages according to its protocol only to the agents in A in round m, and (c) all messages
sent in r are received in the round that they are sent. Let R(F,~v) consist of all runs r that have
context (F,~v). Let R(F ) consist of all runs that have F as the set of failures.
In the consensus problem, we assume that each agent i has an initial preference vi in some set V .
For ease of exposition, we take V = {0, 1}. (Our results can easily be extended to deal with larger
sets of possible values.) A protocol achieves consensus if it satisfies the following properties (9):
• Agreement: No two correct agents decide different values.
• Termination: Every correct agent eventually decides.
• Integrity: All agents decide at most once.
• Validity: If an agent decides v, then v was the initial preference of some agent.
We are interested in one other property: fairness. Note that, once we fix a context, a protocol
for the agents generates a probability on runs, and hence on outcomes, in the obvious way. Fairness
just says that each agent has probability at least 1/n of having its value be the consensus value,
no matter what the context. More precisely, we have the following condition:
• Fairness: For each context (F,~v), if c of the nonfaulty agents in F have initial preference v,
then the probability of v being the consensus decision conditional on R(F,~v) is at least c/n.
It is straightforward to view a consensus problem as a game once we associate a utility function
ui with each agent i, where ui maps each outcome to a utility for i. Technically, it is an extensive-
form Bayesian game. In a Bayesian game, agents have types, which encode private information.
In consensus, an agent’s type is its initial preference. A strategy for agent i in this game is just a
protocol: a function from information sets to actions. As usual, we view an extensive-form game as
being defined by a game tree, with the nodes where an agent i moves into information sets where,
intuitively, two nodes are in the same information set of agent i if i has the same information
at both. In our setting, the nodes in a game tree correspond to global histories, and agent i’s
information set at a global history is determined by i’s history in that global history; that is, we
can take i’s information set at a global history h to consist of all global histories where i’s history
is the same as it is at h. Thus, we identify an information set Ii for agent i with a history hi for
agent i. If Ii is the information set associated with history hi, we denote by R(Ii) the set of runs
r where i has history hi in r(m).
In game theory, a strategy for agent i is a function that associates with each information set
Ii for agent i a distribution over the actions that i can take at Ii. In distributed computing, a
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protocol for agent i is a function that associates with each history hi for agent i a distribution over
the actions that i can take at hi. Since we are identifying histories for agent i with information sets,
it is clear that a protocol for agent i can be identified with a strategy for agent i. In consensus, the
actions involve sending messages and deciding on values. We assume that there is a special value
⊥ that an agent can decide on. By deciding on ⊥, an agent guarantees that there is no consensus.
If we assume that an agent prefers to reach consensus on some value to not reaching consensus at
all, in the language of Ben Porath (7), this means that each agent has a punishment strategy.
We next want to define an appropriate solution concept for our setting. The standard approach
is to say that an equilibrium is a strategy profile (i.e., a tuple of strategies, one for each agent)
where no agent can do better by deviating. “Doing better” is typically taken to mean “gets a
higher expected utility”. However, if we do not have a probability on contexts, we cannot compute
an agent’s expected utility. We thus consider two families of solution concepts. In the first, we take
“doing better” to mean that, for each fixed context, no agent can do better by deviating. Once
we fix the context, the strategy profile generates a probability distribution on runs, and we can
compute the expected utility. In the second approach we assume a distribution on contexts.
A strategy profile ~σ is an ǫ–f -Nash equilibrium if, for each fixed context (F,~v) where there
are at most f faulty agents in F , and all agents i, there is no strategy σ′i for agent i such that i
can improve its expected utility by more than ǫ. Formally, if ui(~τ | R(F,~v)) denotes i’s expected
utility if strategy profile ~τ is played, conditional on the run being in R(F,~v), we require that for all
strategies σ′i for i, ui((σ
′
i, ~σ−i) | R(F,~v)) ≤ ui(~σ | R(F,~v))+ǫ. An f -Nash equilibrium is a 0–f -Nash
equilibrium. The notion of f -Nash equilibrium extends the notion of ex post Nash equilibrium by
allowing up to f faulty agents; a 0-Nash equilibrium is an ex post Nash equilibrium.1
Given a distribution π on contexts and a strategy profile ~σ, π and ~σ determine a probability
on runs denoted π~σ in the obvious way. We say that ~σ is an ǫ–π-Nash equilibrium if, for all agents
i and all strategies σ′i for i, we have ui(σ
′
i, ~σ−i) ≤ ui(~σ) + ǫ, where now the expectation is taken
with respect to the probability π~σ. A π-Nash equilibrium is a 0–π-Nash equilibrium. If π puts
probability 1 on there being no failures, then we get the standard notion of (ǫ-) Nash equilibrium.
3 Possibility and Impossibility Results for Consensus
In this section, we consider the consensus problem from a game-theoretic viewpoint. We focus
on the case where agents care only about consensus, since this type of utility function seems to
capture many situations of interest. For the rest of this section, let β0i be i’s utility if its initial
preference is decided, let β1i be i’s utility if there is consensus, but not on i’s initial preference, and
let β2i be i’s utility if there is no consensus. The assumption that agents care only about consensus
means that, for all i, β0i > β1i > β2i.
Note that although we assume that agents prefer consensus to no consensus, unlike Bei, Chen,
and Zhang. (6), we do not require that our algorithms guarantee consensus when rational agents
deviate. Our algorithm does guarantee that there will be consensus if there are no deviations. On
the other hand, we allow for the possibility that a deviation by a rational agent will result in there
being no consensus. For example, suppose that a rational agent pretends to fail in a setting where
there is a bound f on the number of crash failures. That means that if f other agents actually
do crash, then some agent will detect that f + 1 agents seem to have crashed. Our algorithm
requires that if an agent detects such an inconsistency, then it aborts. If the probability that f
agents actually crash is low, in our framework, a rational agent may decide that it is worth the risk
1This definition is in the spirit of the notion of (k, t)-robustness as defined by Abraham et al. (1), where coalitions
of size k are allowed in addition to t “faulty” agents, but here we restrict the behavior of the faulty agents to crash
failures rather than allowing the faulty agents to follow an arbitrary protocol, and take k = 1. We also allow the
deviating agents to fail (this assumption has no impact on our results).
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of pretending to crash if the potential gain is sufficiently large. Bei, Chen, and Zhang would not
permit this, since they require consensus even if rational agents deviate from the algorithm. This
requirement thus severely limits the possible deviations.
3.1 An Impossibility Result
We start by showing that there is no fair consensus protocol that is an f -Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 1. If ~σ solves fair consensus, agents care only about consensus, and f ≥ 1, then ~σ is
not an f -Nash equilibrium
Proof. Consider the initial configuration ~v where all agents but i have initial preference 0 and i has
initial preference 1. If F 1 is the failure pattern where no agent fails, by Fairness, the agents must
decide 1 with positive probability in context (~v, F 1). It follows that there must be a failure pattern
F 2 where only agent i fails but the agents decide 1 with positive probability in context (~v, F 2). (In
F 2, i fails only after a decision has been made in F 1.) If F 0 is the failure pattern where only i fails,
and i fails immediately, before sending any messages, then it is clear that no agents can distinguish
this context from one where all agents have initial preference 0, so all agents must decide 0, by the
Validity requirement.
Put a partial order ≤ on failure patterns where only i crashes by taking F ≤ F ′ if either i
crashes in an earlier round in F than in F ′, or i crashes in the same round m in both F and F ′,
but the set of agents to whom i sends a message in F is a subset of the set of agents to whom i
sends a message in F ′. Clearly F 0 < F 2. Thus, there exists a minimal failure pattern F ∗ such
that F 0 < F ∗ ≤ F 2, only i fails in F ∗, the consensus is on 1 with positive probability in context
(~v, F ∗), the consensus is 0 with probability 1 in all contexts (F,~v) where only agent i fails in F
and F < F ∗. We can assume without loss of generality that i sends a message to some agent j
in the round m in which i fails. To see this, note that if i crashes in the first round then i must
send a message to some agent (otherwise F ∗ = F 0 and the decision is 0 with probability 1). And
if i crashes in round m > 1, we have assumed that i sends at least one message before crashing
(recall that we identify an agent crashing at round m > 1 and sending no messages with the agent
crashing at round m− 1 and sending to all agents).
Now suppose that an agent j that receives a message from i in round m pretends not to receive
that message. This makes the situation indistinguishable from the context (F,~v) where F is just
like F ∗ except that i does not send a message to j in round m. Since F 0 ≤ F < F ∗, the decision
must be 0 with probability 1 in context (~v, F ). Since j has initial preference 0 in ~v, j can increase
its expected utility by this pretense, so ~σ is not an f -Nash equilibrium.
3.2 Obtaining a π-Nash equilibrium
We now prove a positive result. If we are willing to assume that there is a distribution π on
contexts with some reasonable properties, then we can get a fair π-Nash equilibrium. But, as we
show below, there are some subtle problems in doing this.
Before discussing these problems, it is useful to recall some results from social choice theory.
Consider a setting with n agents where each has a preference order (i.e., a total order) over some set
O of outcomes. A social-choice function is a (possibly randomized) function that maps a profile of
preference orders to an outcome. For example, we can consider agents trying to elect a leader, where
each agent has a preference order over the candidates; the social-choice function chooses a leader
as a function of the expressed preferences. A social-choice function is incentive compatible if no
agent can do better by lying about its preferences. The well-known Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
(10; 18) says that if there are at least three possible outcomes, then the only incentive-compatible
deterministic social-choice function f is a dictatorship; i.e., the function f just chooses a player i
and takes the outcome to be i’s most-preferred candidate, ignoring all other agents’ preferences.
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Gibbard (11) extends this result to show that if there are at least three outcomes, then the only
randomized incentive-compatible social-choice function is a random dictatorship, which essentially
amounts to choosing some player i according to some probability distribution and then choosing
i’s value.
Bei, Chen, and Zehang (6) point out that a strategy profile that solves consensus can be viewed
as a social-choice function: agents have preferences over three outcomes, 0, 1, and ⊥, and the
consensus value (or ⊥, if there is no consensus) can be viewed as the outcome chosen by the
function. A strategy profile that is a Nash equilibrium is clearly incentive-compatible; no agent
has an incentive to lie about its preferences. Thus, it follows from Gibbard’s (11) result that a
solution to rational consensus must be a randomized dictatorship. And, indeed, our protocols can
be viewed as implementing a randomized dictatorship: one agent is chosen at random, and its
value becomes the consensus value. However, implementing such a randomized dictatorship in our
setting is nontrivial because of the possibility of failures.2
3.2.1 A naive protocol
We start with a protocol that, while not solving the problem, has many of the essential features of
our solution, and also helps to point out the subtleties. Consider the following slight variant of one of
the early protocols for consensus (8): In round 1, each agent i broadcasts a tuple (i, vi, xi0, . . . , xif ),
where vi is i’s initial preference, and xit is a random element in {0, . . . , n−t}. For round 2, . . . , f+1,
each agent i broadcasts all the tuples (j, vj , ~xj) that i received and did not already forward in earlier
rounds. At the end of round f + 1, each agent checks for consistency; specifically, it checks that it
has received tuples from at least n− f agents and that it has not received distinct tuples claimed
to have been sent by some agent j. If i detects an inconsistency, then i decides ⊥. Otherwise,
suppose that i received tuples from n− t agents. Then i computes the sum mod n− t of the values
xjt for each agent j from which it received a tuple. If the sum is S, then i decides on the value
of the agent with the (S + 1)st highest id among the n − t agents from which it received tuples.
(Here is where we are implementing the random dictatorship.) Note that the random value xjt is
used by i in computing the consensus value if exactly t faulty agents are discovered; the remaining
random values sent by agent j in the first round are discarded.
It is straightforward to check that if all nonfaulty agents follow this protocol, then they will all
agree on the set of tuples received (see the proof of Theorem 2 for an argument similar in spirit),
and so will choose the same decision value, and each agent whose value is considered has an equal
chance of having their value determine the outcome. But this will not be in general a π-Nash
equilibrium if π allows up to f failures, that is, π puts probability 0 on all failure patterns that
have more than f failures and f ≥ 2.
Consider a distribution π that puts positive probability on all contexts with at most f failures,
and an initial configuration where agent 1 prefers 1, but all other agents prefer 0. Agent 1 follows
the protocol in the first round, and receives a message from all the other agents. We claim that
agent 1 may have an incentive to pretend to fail (without sending any messages) at this point.
Agent 1 can gain by doing this if one of the other agents, say agent 2, crashed in the first round
and sent a message only to agent 1. In this case, if 1 pretends to crash, no other agent will learn 2’s
initial preference, so 1’s initial preference will have a somewhat higher probability (at least 1
n−1−
1
n
)
of becoming the consensus decision. Of course, there is a risk in pretending to crash: if f agents
2We remark that Theorem 1 of Bei, Chen, and Zhang (6) claims that, given a fixed failure pattern, a strategy
profile for consensus that is a Nash equilibrium must implement a dictatorship, rather than randomized dictatorship.
While this is true if we restrict to deterministic strategies, neither we nor Bei, Chen, and Zhang do so. We have not
checked carefully whether results of Bei, Chen, and Zhang that depend on their Theorem 1 continue to hold once we
allow for randomized dictatorships.
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really do crash, then an inconsistency will be detected, and the decision will be ⊥. Let α<f be the
probability of there being fewer than f failures and at least one agent crashing in the first round
who does not send to any agent other than 1 (this is the probability that 1 gains some utility by its
action); let α=f be the probability of there being f crashes other than 1 (this is an upper bound
on the probability that 1 loses utility by its action). Then 1’s expected gain by deviating is at least
(β0i − β1i)
(
1
n− 1
−
1
n
)
α<f − (β0i − β2i)α=f .
This is a small quantity. However, if f is reasonably large and failures are unlikely, we would
expect α=f to be much smaller than α<f , so as the number f of failures that the protocol is designed
to handle increases, deviating becomes more and more likely to produce a (small) gain.
3.2.2 A π-Nash equilibrium
There are three problems with the preceding protocol. The first is that, even if 1 pretends
to fail, 1’s value will be considered a potential consensus value, since everyone received the value
before 1 failed. This means that there is little downside in pretending to fail. Roughly speaking,
we deal with this problem by taking into consideration only the values of nonfaulty agents when
deciding on a consensus value. The second problem is that since agents learn the random values
(xi0, . . . , xif ) that will be used in determining the consensus value in round 1, they may be able
to guess with high probability the value that will be decided on at a point when they can still
influence the outcome. To address this problem, agents do not send these random values in the
first round; instead, they use secret sharing (19), so as to allow the nonfaulty agents to reconstruct
these random values when they need to decide on the consensus value. This prevents agents from
being able to guess with high probability what the decision will be too early. The third problem is
that in some cases agents can safely lie about the messages sent by other agents (e.g., i can pretend
that another agent did not crash). We could solve this by assuming that messages can be signed
using unforgeable signatures. We do not need this or any other cryptographic assumption. Instead,
we use some randomization to ensure that if an agent lies about a message that was sent, it will be
caught with high probability.
Thus, in our algorithm, an agent i generates random numbers for two reasons. The first is that
it generates f +1 random numbers (xi0, . . . , xif ), where xit is used in choosing the consensus value
if there are exactly t faulty agents discovered, and then, as we suggested above, shares them using
secret sharing, so that the numbers can be reconstructed at the appropriate time (see below). The
second is that it generates n − 1 additional random numbers, denoted zmij [i], one for each agent
j 6= i, in each round m, and sends them to j in round m. Then if agent j claims that it got a
message in round m from i, it will have to also provide zmij [i] as proof.
In more detail, we proceed as follows. Initially, each agent i generates a random tuple (xi0, . . . , xif ),
where xit is in {0, . . . , n−t}. It then computes f+1 random polynomials qi0, . . . , qif , each of degree
1, such that qit(0) = xit. It then sends (qi0(j), . . . , qif (j)) to agent j. The upshot of this is that no
agent will be able to compute xit given this information (since one point on a degree-1 polynomial
qit gives no information regarding qit(0)). In addition, in round 1, each agent i sends vi to each
agent j, just as in the naive algorithm; it also generates the random number z1ij [i] and a special
random number z, and sends each agent the vector z1ij = (z
1
ij [1], . . . , z
1
ij [n]), where z
1
ij [j
′] = 0 for
j′ 6= i, j and z1ij[j] = z. (As we said, these random numbers form a “signature”; their role will
become clearer in the proof.) Finally, in round 1, agent i sends a status report SR1i ; we discuss
this in more detail below. In the receive phase of round 1, agent i adds all the values received from
other agents to the set STi.
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In round m with 2 ≤ m ≤ f , i again sends a status report SRmi and a vector z
m
ij . For each
agent j, SRmi [j] is a tuple of the form (m,x), where m is the first round that i knows that j crashed
(m =∞ if i believes that j has not yet crashed), and x is either the vector zm−1ji of random values
sent by j in m−1 (if i believes that j has not yet crashed) or an agent that told i that j crashed in
round m. The tuple zmij is computed by setting z
m
ij [l] for l 6= i, j to be z
m−1
li [l], the random number
sent by l in the previous round (this will be used to prove that i really got a message from l in the
previous round—it is our replacement for unforgeable signatures); again, zmij [i] is a random value
generated by i. In round f +1, i also sends j the secret shares ytli it received in round 1 from each
agent l (i.e., the value qtl (i) that it received from l, assuming that l did not lie). This enables j to
compute the polynomials qit, and hence the secret qit(0) = xit for 0 ≤ t ≤ f .
If i detects an inconsistency in round m ≤ f + 1, then i decides ⊥, where i detects an incon-
sistency in round m if the messages received by i are inconsistent with all agents following the
protocol except that up to f agents may crash. This can happen if
1. j sends incorrectly formatted messages;
2. m = 2 and agents j′ and j′′ 6= i disagree about the random values z1jj′ [j
′] and z1jj′′ [j
′′] sent by
j in round 1;
3. m > 2 and some agent j′ 6= j reports that j sent a value zm−1jj′ [i] in round m − 1 different
from the value zm−2ij [i] sent by i to j in round m− 2;
4. m = f +1 and it is not possible to interpolate a polynomial qtj through the shares y
t
ji received
by i from j in round 1 and the values ytjl received from l 6= j in round f + 1.
5. some agent j′ sends i a status report in round m that says that j crashed in some round m′
and either i receives a message from j in round m′′ > m′ or some agent j′′ sends i a status
report saying that it received a message from j in a round m′′ > m′;
6. for some agents j, j′, and j′′, j sends i a status report in round m that says that j′′ crashed
in round m′ and that j′ reported this, but j′ sends i a status report in round m that says
that j′′ did not crash before round m′′ > m′;
7. for some agents j, j′, and j′′, j sends i a status report in round m that says that j′ did not
crash by round m− 1 and j′′ crashed in some round m′ < m, while j′ sends i a status report
in round m−1 saying that j′′ crashed in round m′′ < m′ (so either j ignored the report about
j′′ sent by j′ or j′ lied to j);
8. more than f crashes are detected by i by round m (i.e., f or more agents have not sent
messages to i or were reported to crash in some round up to and including m).
If agent i does not detect an inconsistency at some round m ≤ f + 1, i proceeds as follows
in round f + 1. For each round 1 ≤ m ≤ f + 1 in a run r, agent i computes NCm(r), the set
of agents that it believes did not crash up to and including round m. Take NC0(r) = N (the
set of all agents). Say that round m in run r seems clean if NCm−1(r) = NCm(r). As we show
(Theorem 2), if no inconsistency is detected in run r, then there must be a round in r that seems
clean. Moreover, we show that if m∗ is the first round in r that seems clean to a nonfaulty agent i,
then all the nonfaulty agents agree that m∗ is the first round that seems clean in r, and they agree
on the initial preference of all agents in NCm∗(r), and the random numbers sent by these agents
in round 1 messages in run r. The agents then use these random numbers to choose an agent j
among the agents in NCm∗(r) and take vj to be the consensus value.
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The pseudocode for the strategy (protocol) ~σcons that implements this idea is given in Figure 1.
Lines 1–14 initialize the values of ST and SR1[j], as well as the random numbers required in
round 1; that is, i generates xi[t] and the corresponding polynomial q
t
i used for secret sharing for
0 ≤ t ≤ f , and random vectors (z1ij [1], . . . , z
1
ij [n]) for j 6= i, where z
1
ij [l] ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1}. In phase
1 (the “sending” phase) of round m, i sends SRmi and z
m
ij . If m = 1, then i also sends vi and
(y0ij, . . . , y
f
ij) to j, where y
t
ij = q
t
i(j); that is, y
t
ij is j’s share of the secret x
t
i. Finally, if m = f + 1,
instead of sending zmij to j, i sends all the shares y
t
li it has received from other agents, so that
all agents can compute the secret (lines 16-21). In phase 2 (the “receive” phase) of round m, i
processes all the messages received and keeps track of all agents who have crashed (lines 22-38).
If i receives a round m message from j, then i adds (j, vj) to STi if m = 1, includes in SR
m
i [j]
the vector z sent by j to i, and updates the status report SRmi [l] of each agent l. Specifically, if j
reports that j′ crashed in a round m′ and i earlier considered it possible that j′ was still nonfaulty
at round m′, then i includes in SRmi [l] the fact that j
′ crashed and that j is an agent that reported
this fact (lines 29-33); if i does not receive a round m message from j and i believed that j did
not crash before, then i marks j as crashed (line 35). In phase 3 (the “update” phase) of round
m ≤ f , i generates the random value zm+1ij [i] for the next round. If i detects an inconsistency, then
i decides ⊥ (line 41); if no inconsistency is detected by the end of round f + 1, then i decides on a
value (lines 46-56) by computing the set NCm′ for every round m
′, determining the earliest round
m∗ that seems clean (NCm∗ = NCm∗−1), computing a random number S ∈ {0, . . . , n − t − 1},
where t is the number of crashes that occurred before m∗, by summing the random numbers xj [t]
of j ∈ NCm∗ (computed by interpolating the polynomials), and deciding on the value of the agent
in NCm∗ with the (S + 1)st highest id.
We now prove that ~σcons gives a π-Nash equilibrium, under reasonable assumptions about π.
We first prove that the protocol satisfies all the properties of fair consensus without making any
assumptions about π.
Theorem 2. ~σcons solves fair consensus if at most f agents crash, f+1 < n, and all the remaining
agents follow the protocol.
Proof. Consider a run r where all agents follow ~σcons and at most f agents crash. It is easy to
see that no inconsistency is detected in r. Since an agent crashes in at most one round and there
are at most f faulty agents, there must exist a round 1 ≤ m ≤ f + 1 when no agent crashes. Let
m∗ be the first such round. We prove that for all nonfaulty agents i and j, NCim(r) = NC
j
m(r)
for all m ≤ m∗ (where NCim(r) denotes i’s version of NCm(r) in run r, and similarly for j). To
see this, fix two nonfaulty agents i and j. Agent i adds agent l to NCim(r) iff i receives a message
from l in every round m′ ≤ m of run r, and i receives no status report indicating that l crashed in
some round m′ ≤ m. If m < m∗, then it must be the case that j also received a message from l
in every round m′ < m of r and neither received nor sent a status report indicating that l crashed
in a round m′ ≤ m; otherwise j would have learned about this crash by round m and would have
told i by round f + 1 that l was faulty (since j is nonfaulty). Thus, l ∈ NCjm(r). If m = m∗, then
l sends a round m′ message to all agents for all m′ < m∗; and since no agents fail in round m∗,
by assumption, we again have l ∈ NCjm(r). Thus, NCim(r) ⊆ NC
j
m(r); similar arguments give the
opposite inclusion.
Note that since no agent crashes in round m∗, it is easy to see that we must have NCim∗(r) =
NCim∗−1(r) for all nonfaulty agents i, so round m
∗ seems clean. With these observations, we can
now prove that ~σcons satisfies each requirement of Fair Consensus in r.
Validity: Since no inconsistency is detected, every agent i decides a value different from ⊥
in r. Agent i always finds some round m∗ that seems clean, computes a nonempty set NCm∗(r),
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which includes at least i, and knows the random numbers sent by these agents in round m∗. Since
STi contains only initial preferences, i decides the initial preference of some agent in NCm∗(r).
Termination and Integrity: Every agent either crashes before deciding or decides exactly
once at the end of round f + 1.
Agreement: We have shown that all nonfaulty agents i and j agree on NCm(r) for allm ≤ m
∗.
We thus omit the superscripts i and j on NCm(r) from here on in. Given this, they agree on whether
each round m ≤ m∗ seems clean and thus agree that some m ≤ m∗ is the first round that seems
clean in r. Moreover, i and j receive identical round 1 messages from the agents in NCm(r). It
follows that i adds a tuple (l, vl) to STi for l ∈ NCm(r) iff j adds that tuple to STj . Suppose
that |NCm(r)| = n− t. Since NCm(r) must include all the nonfaulty agents, we must have t ≤ f .
Clearly, if l ∈ NCm(r), then i and j must receive the values ytli and y
t
lj in round 1 messages sent by
l. Agents i and j also receive ytll′ from each nonfaulty agent l
′. Since there are at least n − f ≥ 2
nonfaulty agents, and l follows σconsl , i and j will be able to interpolate the polynomial q
t
l , and
compute xl[t] = q
t
l (0). Consequently, i and j agree on the information relevant to the consensus
decision, so must decide on the same value.
Fairness: The probability of the initial preference of each agent in NCm(r) being decided is
1/|NCm(r)|. Since |NCm(r)| ≤ n, if c nonfaulty agents in NCm initially have preference v, then
the probability of v being decided is at least c/|NCm(r)| ≥ c/n. Since NCm(r) contains all the
nonfaulty agents, Fairness holds.
It remains to show that ~σcons is a π-Nash equilibrium. We show that ~σcons is a π-Nash equilib-
rium under appropriate assumptions about π. Specifically, we assume that π supports reachability
and is uniform, notions that we now define. The reachability assumption has three parts. The
first two parts consider how likely it is that some information that an agent j has will reach an
agent that will decide on a value; the third part is quite similar, and considers how likely it is
that a nonfaulty agent becomes aware that an agent j failed in round m. Of course, the answer to
these questions depends in part on whether agents are supposed to send messages in every round
(as is the case with ~σcons). In the formal definition, we implicitly assume that this is the case.
(So, effectively, the reachability assumption is appropriate only for protocols where agents send
messages in every round.) Given agents i and j 6= i, a round-m information set Ii for i, a failure
pattern F compatible with Ii, in that R(F ) ∩ R(Ii) 6= ∅, and m
′ ≥ m, say that a nonfaulty agent
l 6= i is reachable from j without i between rounds m′ and f + 1 given F if there is a sequence
jm′ , . . . , jf+1 of agents different from i such that j = jm′ , for m
′′ = {m′, . . . , f}, jm′′ has not failed
prior to round m′′ according to F , and either does not fail in round m′′ or, if m′′ < f +1, jm′′ fails
in roundm′′ but sends a message to jm′′+1 before failing (i.e., if (jm′′ ,m
′′, A) ∈ F , then jm′′+1 ∈ A),
and l = jf+1.
Note that if j is nonfaulty according to F , then a nonfaulty agent is certainly reachable from j
without i between rounds m′ and f +1; just take jm′ = · · · = jf+1 = j. But even if j fails in round
m′ according to F , as long j can send a message to a nonfaulty agent other than i, or there is an
appropriate chain of agents, then a nonfaulty agent is reachable from j without i by round f + 1.
The probability of there being a failure pattern for which a nonfaulty agent is reachable from j
without i depends in part on how many agents are known to have failed in Ii; the more agents are
known not to have failed, the more likely we would expect a nonfaulty agent to be reachable from
j without i.
We also want this condition to hold even conditional on a set of failure patterns, provided that
the set of failure patterns does not favor particular agents failing. To make this precise, we need
a few more definitions. Say that an agent j is known to be faulty in Ii if j is faulty in all runs in
R(Ii); thus, j is known to be faulty in Ii if j did not send a message to i at round m− 1 according
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to Ii. Say that a set F of failure patterns satisfies the permutation assumption with respect to a
set F of failures and an information set Ii if, for all permutations g of the agents that keep fixed
the agents that fail in F or are known to be faulty in Ii, if F
′ ∈ F , then so is g(F ′), where g(F ′)
is the failure pattern that results by replacing each triple (j,m′′, A) ∈ F ′ by (g(j),m′′, g(A)). F
satisfies the permutation assumption with respect to Ii if F satisfies it with respect to the empty
set of failures and Ii. Let R(F) = ∪F∈FR(F ).
We say that π supports reachability if for all agents i, all time-m information sets Ii such that
M agents are not known to be faulty in Ii, failure pattern F , and all sets F of failure patterns that
satisfy the permutation assumption with respect to F and Ii, we have that
1. if j 6= i is not known to be faulty in Ii and is not in F , then
π(no nonfaulty agent l 6= i is reachable from j without i
between rounds m and f + 1 | R(Ii) ∩R(F) ∩R(F )) ≤
1
2M ;
2. if j 6= i is not known to be faulty in Ii and is not in F , then
π(no nonfaulty agent l 6= i is reachable from j without i
between rounds m− 1 and f + 1 | R(Ii) ∩R(F) ∩R(F )) ≤
1
2M ;
3. if a message from some agent j not in F was received up to and including round m− 2 but
not in round m− 1, then
π(no nonfaulty agent l 6= i is reachable from an agent j′ 6= i that did not receive a message
from j in round m− 1 without i between rounds m and f + 1 | R(Ii) ∩R(F) ∩R(F )) ≤
1
2M .
The first two requirements essentially say that if i hears from j in round m−1, then it is likely that
other agents will hear from j as well in a way that affects the decision, even if i does not forward
j’s information. That is, it is unlikely that j will fail right away, and do so in a way that prevents
its information from having an effect. Similarly, the third requirement says that if i does not hear
from j in round m−1 (as reflected in Ii), then it is likely that other agents will hear that j crashed
at or before round m− 1 even if i does not report this fact.
We next define the notion of uniformity. Given two failure patterns F 1 and F 2, we say that F 1
and F 2 are equivalent if there is a permutation g of the agents such that F 2 = g(F 1). We say that
π is uniform if, for all equivalent failure patterns F 1 and F 2 and vectors ~v of initial preferences, we
have π(F 1, ~v) = π(F 2, ~v). Intuitively, if π is uniform, then the probability of each failure pattern
depends only on the number of messages omitted by each agent in each round; it does not depend
on the identity of faulty agents.
The following lemma will prove useful in the argument, and shows where the uniformity as-
sumption comes into play. Roughly speaking, the lemma says that if the agents run ~σcons , then
each agent i’s expected value of its initial preference being the consensus value is just its current
knowledge about the fraction of nonfaulty agents that have its initial preference. The lemma’s
claim is somewhat stronger, because it allows for expectations conditional on certain sets of agents
failing.
Before stating the lemma, we need some definitions. Let R(D≥m) consist of all runs where
a decision is made and the first round that seems clean is m′ ≥ m. A set F of failure patterns,
a failure pattern F , a round-m information set Ii for i, and m
′ ≥ m are compatible if (a) all
the failures in F happen before round m′, (b) m′ ≤ f + 1, and (c) F satisfies the permutation
assumption with respect to Ii and F . Given an agent i and a run r where consensus is reached,
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let nc(r) be the number of agents who apparently have not crashed in the first round of r that
seems clean (i.e., if m is the first clean round in r, then nc(r) = |NCm(r)|), and let ac(r) be the
number of these agents in r that have initial preference 1. Given an information set Ii ∈ Ii and a
failure pattern F , let AF be the set of agents who are faulty in F ; let A consist of the agents known
to be faulty in Ii; let n(Ii, F ) = n − |A ∪ AF |; and let a(Ii, F ) be the agents not in A ∪ AF that
have initial preference 1. Note that nc and ac are random variables on runs (i.e., functions from
runs to numbers); technically, a(Ii, F ) and n(Ii, F ) are also random variables on runs, but n(Ii, F )
is constant on runs in R(Ii), while a(Ii, F ) is constant on runs in R(Ii) if m ≥ 2, since then Ii
contains the initial values of nonfaulty agents.
Lemma 1. If i is an agent who is nonfaulty at the beginning of round m ≤ f+1 and has information
set Ii (so that Ii is a round-m information set), F is a failure pattern, m
′ ≥ m, F is a set of failure
patterns such that F , F , Ii, and m
′ are compatible, π is a distribution that supports reachability
and is uniform, and π~σcons (R(Ii) ∩R(F ) ∩R(F) ∩R(D≥m′)) > 0, then
E[ac/nc | R(Ii) ∩R(F ) ∩R(F) ∩R(D≥m′)] = E[a(Ii, F )/n(Ii, F ) | R(Ii)], (1)
where the expectation is taken with respect to π~σcons .
Proof. Let f ′ = |A ∪ AF | = n − n(Ii, F ). For all f
′′ with f ′ ≤ f ′′ ≤ f , let Rf ′′ consists of all runs
r where agents are using ~σcons such that exactly f ′′ agents are viewed as faulty in the first round
that seems clean. We claim that, for all f ′′, we have
E[ac/nc | Rf ′′ ∩R(Ii) ∩R(F ) ∩R(F) ∩R(D≥m′)] = E[a(Ii, F )/n(Ii, F ) | R(Ii)).
Clearly, (1) follows immediately from this claim.
We can calculate the relevant expectations using algebra, but there is an easier way to see that
the claim holds. First suppose that m′ > 1 (so that a(Ii, F ) and n(Ii, F ) are constants on R(Ii)).
If the first clean round occurs at or after m′, then it is easy to see that all the agents in A∪AF will
be viewed as faulty in that round (by all nonfaulty agents), since all these agents fail before round
m′. Note that the set of agents viewed as faulty in the first clean round of run r is completely
determined by the failure pattern in r. Moreover, it easily follows from the uniformity assumption,
the fact that ~σcons treats agents uniformly, and the fact that F satisfies the permutation assumption
that each set B of cardinality f ′′ that includes A∪AF is equally likely to be the set of agents viewed
as faulty in the first clean round of a run in Rf ′′ ∩R(Ii) ∩R(F ) ∩R(F) ∩R(D≥m).
Consider the following experiment: choose a set B of f ′′ agents containing A ∪ AF uniformly
at random, and then choose one more agent j /∈ B at random. Assign a pair (B, j) value 1 if the
agent j chosen has initial preference 1 in all runs of Ii; otherwise, assign it value 0. It is easy to see
that the expected value of a pair is precisely E[ac/nc | Rf ′′ ∩R(Ii)∩R(F )∩R(F)∩R(D≥m)]. The
f ′′ agents in B constitute the set of faulty agents. The fact that B is chosen uniformly at random
(among sets of cardinality f ′′ containing A∪AF ) corresponds to the assumption that all choices of
B are equally likely. The last agent chosen determines the consensus value; as long as there is at
least one nonfaulty agent, the procedure used in runs of ~σcons guarantees that all choices of j are
equally likely.
Now switch the order that the choices are made: we first choose a nonfaulty agent not in A∪AF
uniformly at random and then choose f ′′−|A∪AF | other agents not in A∪AF who will fail uniformly
at random. It is clear that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the choices in the first
experiment and the second experiment: in corresponding choices, the same set of f ′′ − f ′ agents
fail and the same other agent is chosen to determine the consensus value. Moreover, corresponding
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choices are equally likely. With the second experiment, it is immediate that the expected value is
a(Ii, F )/n(Ii, F ).
If m′ ≤ 1, then the argument is the same, except that the value of (B, j) is chosen according to
the distribution of initial preferences of agents j /∈ B in runs where the faulty agents are exactly
the ones in B. This concludes the proof.
Theorem 3 shows that ~σcons is a π-Nash equilibrium, as long as f + 1 < n and π supports
reachability and is uniform.
Theorem 3. If f +1 < n, π is a distribution that supports reachability, is uniform, and allows up
to f failures, and agents care only about consensus, then ~σcons is a π-Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Fix an agent i and a strategy σi. We must show that we have
ui(~σ
cons ) ≥ ui(σi, ~σ
cons
−i ). (2)
Suppose, by way of contradiction, that (2) does not hold. Then i must deviate from σconsi at
some round m. Consider all the ways that i can deviate in round m that can affect the outcome
(we discuss what it means to affect the outcome shortly):
1. i pretends to crash; it does not send messages to some subset of agents in round m (and then
does not not send messages from then on).
2. m = 1 and i sends (i, 1 − vi) to some agent j 6= i (i.e., i lies about its initial preference to at
least one agent).
3. i sends an incorrectly formatted message to j 6= i (i.e., i sends a message that is different in
format from that required by ~σcons).
4. m = 1 and i sends values ytij to an agent j 6= i such that there is no polynomial q
t
i of degree
1 that interpolates them all or does not choose the polynomials qti at random.
5. i does not choose some zmij appropriately (as specified by ~σ
cons ).
6. m < f + 1 and i decides on a value in {0, 1} in round m or m = f + 1 and i decides on an
incorrect value on the equilibrium path.
7. m = f + 1 and i sends a value ytji to j
′ 6= i different from the value ytji that i received from j
in round 1.
8. i does not send a round m′ < m message to some agent j that i does not know at round m
to have been faulty in round m′, and sends a round m message to j′ 6= i.
9. i lies about j’s status to j′ 6= i; that is, i sends j′ a status report SR
m
i such that SR
m
i [j] 6=
SRmi [j].
Note that in a deviation of type 8, we did not consider the case where i deviates by not sending a
message to j in round m′ and then sending a message to j′ if i knows that j failed in round m′.
In this case, i’s deviation is undetectable, and will not affect the outcome. Clearly if i performs
only such undetectable deviations, then σi is equivalent to σ
cons
i , so we do not need to worry about
these deviations.
We consider these deviations one by one, and show that none of them makes i better off. More
precisely, we show that if σi involves only deviations 1–d on the list above for appropriate choices
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of d, then (2) holds. But even this “brute force” argument requires some care, using a somewhat
delicate induction on the number of deviations that i is better off not deviating.
We now prove (2). We start with the first type of deviation; that is, suppose that σi involves
only i pretending to crash and that if I∗i is a time-m
∗ information set for i, F is a set of failure
patterns that satisfies the permutation assumption relative to I∗i , π~σcons (R(I
∗
i ) ∩ R(F)) > 0, and
either there are no deviations in runs in R(I∗i ) or the first deviation in a run in R(I
∗
i ) occurs at or
after information set I∗i , then
ui(~σ
cons | R(I∗i ) ∩R(F)) ≥ ui((σi, ~σ
cons
−i ) | R(I
∗
i ) ∩R(F)). (3)
(2) clearly follows from (3) by taking I∗i to be the initial information set and letting F be the set
of all failure patterns compatible with I∗i .
Given a strategy profile ~σ, let R(~σ) denote the possible runs of ~σ. If there are no runs in
R(σi, ~σ
cons
−i ) ∩ R(I
∗
i ) in which i pretends to fail, then conditional on R(I
∗
i ), σi and σ
osc
i agree, so
(3) holds. If there are runs in R(σi, ~σ
cons
−i ) ∩ R(I
∗
i ) in which i pretends to fail, then we proceed
by induction on the number of information sets Ii at or after I
∗
i at which i first pretends to crash
such that π(σi,~σcons−i )(R(I
∗
i ) ∩ R(F) ∩ R(Ii)) > 0. Suppose that i first pretends to crash at some
information set Ii that comes at or after I
∗
i and π(σi,~σcons−i )(R(I
∗
i )∩R(F) ∩R(Ii)) > 0. Thus, there
are no runs in R(Ii) in which i pretends to crash prior to information set Ii. Let σ
′
i be identical to
σi except that i does not pretend to fail at or after Ii. By (3),
ui(~σ
cons | R(I∗i ) ∩R(F)) ≥ ui((σ
′
i, ~σ
cons
−i ) | R(I
∗
i ) ∩R(F)).
We now show that
ui((σ
′
i, ~σ
cons
−i ) | R(I
∗
i ) ∩R(F)) ≥ ui((σi, ~σ
cons
−i ) | R(I
∗
i ) ∩R(F)). (4)
(3) follows immediately.
To prove (4), since R(I∗i ) is the union of all the time-m information sets for i that follow I
∗
i , it
suffices to prove that for all time-m information sets I ′i for i that follow I
∗
i , we have
ui((σ
′
i, ~σ
cons
−i ) | R(I
′
i) ∩R(F)) ≥ ui((σi, ~σ
cons
−i ) | R(I
′
i) ∩R(F)) (5)
(provided, of course, that π~σcons (R(I
′
i) ∩ R(F)) > 0; in the future, we take it for granted that the
relevant results apply only if we are conditioning on a set with positive measure). (4) clearly follows
from (5), since the time-m information sets for i partition R(I∗i ) ∩R(F).
If I ′i 6= Ii, then (5) holds trivially, since in that case σ
′
i agrees with σi at I
′
i and all subsequent
information sets. Thus, it suffices to prove (5) in the case that I ′i = Ii. We can assume without
loss of generality that i’s actions at and after Ii are deterministic. If i is better off by pretending
to fail at Ii with some probability, then i is better off by pretending to fail at Ii with probability 1.
Note that (a) whether or not there is a seemingly clean round, (b) which is the first seemingly clean
round if there is one, and (c) which agents are considered nonfaulty at that round are completely
determined by the failure pattern. Specifically, a particular failure pattern F ′ ∈ F determines the
first seemingly clean round m∗. We partition the set F into four sets, F1, . . . ,F4, and show that
conditional on R(Ii) ∩ R(Fj), agent i does at least as well by using σ
′
i as it does by using σi, for
j = 1, . . . , 4.
F1 deals with a trivial case; the remaining elements of the partition consider the first seemingly
clean round of (σ′i, ~σ
cons
−i ) and (σi, ~σ
cons
−i ). (5) in the case that I
′
i = Ii clearly follows from this.
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(a) F1 consists of the failure patterns in F where with (σi, ~σ
cons
−i ) an inconsistency is detected
(because f + 1 agents seem to fail). Clearly, conditional on R(Ii) ∩ R(F1), i’s utility is at
least as high with (σ′i, ~σ
cons
−i ) as with (σi, ~σ
cons
−i ). It may be that with some failure patterns in
F1, no inconsistency is detected if i uses (σ
′
i, ~σ
cons
−i ). But if the failure pattern is such that an
inconsistency is detected with σ′i, then an inconsistency is certainly detected with σi. Thus,
in all the remaining runs, we consider no inconsistency is detected with either σi or σ
′
i.
(b) F2 consists of the failure patterns F
′ ∈ F − F1 such that in all runs r
′ in R((σ′i, ~σ
cons
−i )) ∩
R(Ii) ∩R(F
′)), the first clean round occurs at some round m1 < m. It is easy to check that
in a run r of R((σi, ~σ
cons
−i )) corresponding to r
′, the first clean round also occurs at m1, so
that all agents get the same utility at r and r′. Thus, conditional on R(Ii)∩R(F2), i’s utility
is the same with (σ′i, ~σ
cons
−i ) and (σi, ~σ
cons
−i ).
(c) F3 consists of the failure patterns in F − F1 that result in m being the first seemingly clean
round with both (σi, ~σ
cons
−i ) and (σ
′
i, ~σ
cons
−i ). This can happen in runs in R(σi, ~σ
cons
−i ) only if
the fact that i started pretending to fail at Ii with σi is not detected by any agent that does
not crash (i.e., if no agent that decides is reachable from an agent that does not hear from
i in round m). Conditional on R(Ii) ∩ R(F3), i’s utility is the same with (σ
′
i, ~σ
cons
−i ) and
(σi, ~σ
cons
−i ).
(d) F4 consists of the failure patterns in F − F1 where the first seemingly clean round with
(σ′i, ~σ
cons
−i ) comes at or after m while with (σi, ~σ
cons
−i ), the first clean round m
∗ comes strictly
before m or strictly after m. Let M be the number of agents that are not known to be faulty
in Ii, and let a be the number of these that share i’s initial preference. It is straightforward
to check that F4 satisfies the permutation assumption with respect to Ii, so by Lemma 1,
conditional on R(Ii) ∩R(F4), i’s expected utility with (σ
′
i, ~σ
cons
−i ) is
aβ0i
M
+ (M−a)β1i
M
.
To compute i’s expected utility with (σi, ~σ
cons
−i ), we must first consider how we could have m
∗
(the first seemingly clean round) occur before round m. This can happen if (and only if) i
first learns in round m′′ − 1 ≥ m − 1 that some agent j∗ crashed in round m′ ≤ m − 1, no
agent nonfaulty agent j′ (other than i) will learn that j∗ crashed in round m′ if i pretends
to crash, and, as a result, round m′ will seem clean to j′. This, in turn can happen if (and
only if) either (i) m′ = m− 1, and i does not hear from j∗ for the first time in round m− 1,
or (ii) m′ < m, i did not hear from j∗ for the first time in round m′ + 1, and there is a chain
j1, . . . , jm′′−m′ of agents that “hides” the fact that j
∗ actually crashed in round m′ from i
(and all other nonfaulty agents) until round m′′: j1 does not hear from j
∗ in round m′; for
h < m′′ − m, i does not hear from jh in round m
′ + h; but jh+1 hears from jh in round
m′ + 1 (thus, j2 hears that j
∗ crashed in round m′ from j1 in round m
′ + 1, j3 hears about
this from j2 in round m
′ + 2, and so on), i hears from jm′′−m′ in round m
′′ (and so hears in
round m′′ that j∗ crashed in round m′); and there is no shorter chain like this from j∗ to i.
Note that i can tell by looking at its history at time m whether it is possible that (i) or (ii)
occurrred. Specifically, (i) can occur only if there is an agent j∗ that i does not hear from for
the first time in round m, and (ii) can occur only if there is a chain j1, . . . , jm−m′ such that,
for h′ < m −m′, i does not hear from jh for the first time in round m
′ + h, either does not
hear from jm−m′ in round m or hears from jm−m′ that j
∗ crashed in round m′, and i does
not hear that j∗ crashed in round m′ before round m. Also note that in case (ii), i’s history
must be such that none of the rounds between m′ + 1 and m′′ − 1 (inclusive) can seem clean
to i (or the other nonfaulty agents).
Agent i’s expected utility with (σi, ~σ
cons
−i ) conditional on R(Ii) ∩R(F4) depends on whether
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i’s history (and hence Ii) is such that (i) or (ii) could have occurred. If (i) or (ii) could not
have occurred, then we must have m∗ > m. To compute i’s expected utility with (σi, ~σ
cons
−i ),
we can apply Lemma 1, but now we must include i among the faulty agents (since in the
first seemingly clean round in runs of R(σi, ~σ
cons
−i )∩R(Ii)∩R(F4), i will be viewed as faulty
by the nonfaulty agents). Let F be the failure pattern {(i,m,A)}, where A is the set of
agents to which i sends a message in round m according to σi. Since m
∗ > m, we have
R(Ii)∩R(F4)∩R(F ) = R(Ii)∩R(F4)∩R(F )∩R(D≥m+1). Since Ii, F4, F , and m+1 are
compatible, by Lemma 1, i’s expected utility with (σi, ~σ
cons
−i ) conditional on R(Ii)∩R(F4) is
(a−1)β0i
M−1 +
(M−a)β1i
M−1 . Since β1i > β2i, conditional on R(Ii) ∩ R(F4), i’s utility is higher with
(σ′i, ~σ
cons
−i ) than with (σi, ~σ
cons
−i ).
Now if Ii is such that (i) or (ii) could happen, we use the reachability assumption to provide
upper bounds on the probability that m∗ < m. Note that if (i) holds, m∗ < m only if no
nonfaulty agent other than i hears that j∗ crashed in round m′. By part 3 of the reachability
assumption, this happens with probabilty at most 1/2M . If (ii) holds, m∗ < m only if there
is an appropriate chain. If m′′ = m, then agent jm−m′ in the chain is not known to be faulty
in Ii, so by part 1 of the reachability assumption, the probability that no nonfaulty agent
other than i hears from jm−m′+1 that j
∗ crashed in round m′, conditional on R(Ii)∩R(F4) is
again at most 1/2M . Similarly, if m′′ > m, then jm−m′+1 is not known to be faulty in Ii, so
by part 2 of the reachability assumption, the probability that no nonfaulty agent other than
i hears from jm−m′+1 that j
∗ crashed in round m′, conditional on R(Ii) ∩R(F4) is again at
most 1/2M . Thus, the probability that m∗ < m conditional on R(Ii) ∩ R(F4) is at most
1/M , even if both (i) and (ii) can occur. In the runs of R(σi, ~σ
cons
−i ) ∩R(Ii) ∩R(F4) ∩R(F )
where the first seemingly clean round is m∗ < m, i’s utility is at most β0i. If (i) or (ii) could
happen and the first clean round in not before m, then it must occur strictly after m, as
noted above. If it does occur after time m, then by the argument above, i’s expected utility is
(a−1)β0i
M−1 +
(M−a)β1i
M−1 . Thus, if Ii is such that (i) or (ii) could happen, then i’s expected utility
conditional on R(Ii) ∩R(F4) is at most(
1
M
+
M − 1
M
·
a− 1
M − 1
)
β0i +
M − 1
M
·
M − a
M − 1
β1i =
a
M
β0i +
M − a
M
β1i.
In either case, conditional on R(Ii) ∩ R(F4), i’s utility is at least as high with (σ
′
i, ~σ
cons
−i ) as
with (σi, ~σ
cons
−i ).
The sets F1, . . . ,F4 form a partition of F : they are clearly disjoint, and it is not possible for the
first clean round with (σ′i, ~σ
cons
−i ) to be strictly after m while the first clean round with (σi, ~σ
cons
−i )
is m. Thus, we have proved (5) in the case that I ′i = Ii, as desired. This completes the argument
for deviations of type 1.
Now, consider a deviation of type 2. If σi is a strategy with deviations of only types 1 and 2,
let σ′i be the strategy identical to σi except that i does not lie about its initial value and behaves
as if it had not deviated from σi afterwards. There is a bijection between runs of (σi, ~σ
cons
−i ) and
runs of (σ′i, ~σ
cons
−i ), so that two corresponding runs r and r
′ are identical except that in run r agent
i may lie about its initial value and in r′ agent i does not. (So, among other things, the random
choices made in r and r′ are the same.) Again, the lie does not affect which round (if any) will
be considered clean nor which agents will be viewed as nonfaulty in that round. If i is not one of
the agents considered nonfaulty in the clean round, or if i is considered nonfaulty but i is not the
agent whose preference is chosen, then the outcome is the same in r and r′. If i is the agent whose
value is chosen, then i is worse off if it lies than if it doesn’t. Thus, i does not gain if it lies about
its initial value. Again, (5) holds. Thus, (3) holds for deviations of types 1 and 2.
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Finally, we show that (3) holds if we allow deviations of types 3–9. To deal with these, we
proceed by induction on the number of deviations of types 3–9 in σi, removing deviations starting
from the earliest deviation. That is, we consider the information set Ii where the first deviation
of type 3–9 occurs, so that the only deviations prior to Ii are of type 1 or 2, and show that we
can do better by removing the deviation at Ii. Before getting into the details, we need to state
carefully what counts as a deviation of type 1 or 2 prior to Ii. We try to “explain” as much as
possible by i pretending to fail, so as to delay the first deviation not of types 1 or 2 as late possible.
Thus, if i pretends to fail at information set I ′i (i.e., sends message according to σ
cons
i up to I
′
i, sends
messages, again according to σconsi , to some agents at I
′
i and does not send messages to some agents
it does not know to be faulty), and then sends a message to some agent at some information set I ′′i
after I ′i, then we say that the first deviation not of types 1 and 2 occurs at I
′′
i (it is a deviation of
type 8).
In the base case, σi contains no deviations of type 3–9; we have already shown that (3) holds
in this case. For the inductive step, let Ii be an information set at which σi has a deviation of type
3–9 and there are no deviations of type 3–9 prior to Ii. We consider each deviation of type 3–9 in
turn.
3. If i sends an incorrectly formatted message to j, then either j receives this message and
decides ⊥ or j crashes before sending any messages to an agent j′ 6= i (or before deciding, if
m = f). Let σ′i be the strategy that is identical to σi except i sends a correctly formatted
message to j. In all cases, i does at least as well if i uses the strategy σ′i as it does using σi.
Thus, (3) follows from the induction hypothesis.
4. If m = 1 and i sends values ytij to an agent j such that there is no polynomial q
t
i of degree 1
that interpolates them then either an inconsistency is detected or i would have done at least
as well by choosing these values according to some polynomial. (Here and in the remainder of
the proof, when we say “an inconsistency is detected”, we mean “an inconsistency is detected
by a nonfaulty agent different from i”.) If i does not choose qti at random, since f + 1 < n,
there exists a nonfaulty agent j 6= i that sends values based on truly random polynomials.
Thus, the agent whose preference determines the consensus value is chosen at random, even if
qti is not chosen at random. So choosing q
t
i at random does not affect the expected outcome.
Again, (3) follows from the induction hypothesis.
5. Suppose that i does not choose zmij according to protocol. From the perspective of an agent
j′ 6= i following the protocol σconsj′ , it does not affect the outcome if these values are not
chosen randomly. So, yet again, i does just as well if i chooses the numbers randomly, and
(3) holds.
6. Clearly there is no benefit to i deciding on a value other than ⊥ early (it can decide the same
value at round f +1) and no benefit in deciding an incorrect value (since this guarantees that
there is no consensus). Thus, yet again, (3) holds.
7. Suppose that m = f + 1 and i lies about ytji to some l 6= i for j 6= i. If it turns out that
there are not n− t agents that seem to be nonfaulty in the first clean round, then the value
of ytji is irrelevant; it is not used in the calculation. If there are n − t seemingly nonfaulty
agents in the clean round, then either an inconsistency is detected due to the lie (if ytji is sent
to some nonfaulty agent, who then cannot interpolate a polynomial through it and the other
values received), in which case i is clearly worse off, or the sum S computed will be a random
element of {0, . . . , n− t− 1}, so the initial preference of each of the seeming nonfaulty agents
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is equally likely to be chosen whether or not i lies. Thus, i does not gain by lying about ytji,
so (3) holds.
8. Suppose that i does not send a message in round m′ < m to an agent j that i does not know
(at round m) to have been faulty at round m′ and then i sends a message to j′ 6= i in round
m. If m′ < m− 1, since m is the first round that a deviation of types 3–9 occurs, and since i
does not know at any round m′′ < m that j was faulty at round m′ (since i does not know it
at round m), i does not send messages between rounds m′ and m. Thus, sending a round m
message to j′ either leads to an inconsistency being detected or does not affect the outcome
(which can be the case if j fails before deciding ⊥). This means that i does at least as well if
i does not send a message to j′ at round m, so (3) holds. So we can assume without loss of
generality that m′ = m−1, and that m′ is the first round that i did not send a message to an
agent j. Similarly, we can assume that i gets a message from j′ in round m− 1; otherwise we
can consider the strategy σ′i where i does send a message to j
′ in round m− 1, and otherwise
agrees with σi, and again the result follows from the induction hypothesis.
The rest of the proof proceeds much in the spirit of the proof for deviations of type 1. We
partition F into subsets F1, . . . ,F4, and show that, for j = 1, . . . , 4, i does at least as well
with ~σcons as with (σi, ~σ
cons
−i ) conditional on R(Ii)∩R(Fj); (3) then follows. As in the case of
type 1 failures, F1 consists of the failure patterns in F where, with (σi, ~σ
cons
−i ), f + 1 failures
are detected. Clearly, conditional on R(Ii) ∩ R(F1), i’s utility is higher with (~σ
cons) than
with (σi, ~σ
cons
−i ).
Let F2 be the set of failure patterns in F − F1 such that in runs from R(Ii) ∩ R(F2), the
agents that decide do not hear about i’s round m message to j′. Let σ′i be identical to σi
except that at Ii agent i does not send a message to j
′. It is not hard to check that F2
satisfies the permutation assumption with respect to Ii. Clearly, i gets the same utility with
σi as with σ
′
i conditional on R(Ii) ∩ R(F2). Since, with σ
′
i, i has fewer deviations of types
3–9 than with σi, by the induction hypothesis, (3) holds conditional on R(Ii) ∩R(F2).
Now let F3 consist of all failure patterns in F −F1 such that, with σi, the agents that decide
hear both that i sent a message to j′ in round m and that i did not send a message to some
agents in round m − 1. Thus, with σi, an inconsistency will be detected, so i does at least
as well with σ′i as with σi conditional on R(Ii) ∩ R(F3). F3 also satisfies the permutation
assumption with respect to Ii, so (3) holds conditional on R(Ii) ∩ R(F3) by the induction
hypothesis.
Finally, let F4 be the remaining failure patterns in F −F1, the ones where agents that decide
hear about the message sent by i to j′ but not about the omissions of i in round m− 1. Let
I ′i be the round-(m− 1) information set preceding Ii, and let σ
′′
i be a strategy identical to σi,
except that at at I ′i i does not deviate from σ
cons
i . Conditional on R(Ii) ∩ R(F4), i clearly
gets the same utility with (σi, ~σ
cons
−i ) as with (σ
′′
i , ~σ
cons
−i ). It is not hard to show that F4 also
satisfies the permutation assumption with respect to Ii. With σ
′′
i , i does not deviate at Ii,
so i has fewer deviations of types 3–9 than with σi. Thus, by the induction hypothesis, (3)
holds conditional on R(Ii) ∩R(F4). This completes the argument for deviations of type 8.
9. Suppose that i lies about j’s status to an agent j′ 6= i. That is, either (a) i says that j did
not crash before round m′ although i knows that j did crash in round m′ − 1; (b) i says that
j crashed at or before round m′ although i received a message from j in round m′ and either
m′ = m− 1 or m′ < m and i did not receive a message from any agent saying that j crashed
in round m′; or (c) i lies about the numbers zm−1ji sent by j or about which agent reported
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that j crashed. Again we consider each of these cases in turn. We can assume without loss of
generality that i did not pretend to crash in Ii, since otherwise the arguments for deviations
of type 8 would apply.
(a) Suppose that i lies by saying that j did not crash before m′ even though i knows that j
did in fact crash earlier. This means that i is claiming to have received a message from
j in round m′. Clearly, it cannot be the case that i knows that j crashed before m′ − 1,
because then i would know that no agent would get a message from j in round m′ − 1,
and an inconsistency would be detected by j′ if the deviation had any impact on the
outcome. Thus, we can assume that j in fact crashed in round m′ − 1. Since we are
assuming that i first deviates in round m, i must have learned in round m − 1 about
j’s crash in round m′ − 1. That means that either (i) m′ = m and i did not receive a
message from j in round m− 1 or (ii) m′ < m and i must have received a message from
some agent j′′ with this information in round m − 1. We can assume without loss of
generality that i gets a message from j′ in round m−1, for otherwise i would do at least
as well by not lying to j, and (3) would hold by the induction hypothesis.
Consider case (i). If m = 2, then i pretending that j did not crash in round 1 can
help only if this leads to round 1 being viewed as clean. But this is the case only if j′
received a message from j in round 1 (although i did not). According to σconsi , i’s round
m message includes the status report SRmi . Agent i must send such a status report even
with σi, otherwise an inconsistency is detected and clearly i is worse off. Since i claims to
have received a message from j in round 1, SRmi [j] has the form (∞, z
1
ji), where z
m−1
ji [i]
is the random number sent in round 1 to all agents. Given that we have assumed that j
also sent a round 1 message to j′, j′ also received z1ji[i] = z
1
jj′ [j
′]. Thus, j′ will detect an
inconsistency and decide ⊥ unless i correctly guesses z1ji[i]. The probability of i guessing
z1ji[i] correctly is at most
1
n
.
We now partition F into three sets of failure patterns F1, F2, and F3, and show that
for j = 1, 2, 3, i does at least as well with ~σcons as with (σi, ~σ
cons
−i ). Again, F1 consists
of the failure patterns in F where with (σi, ~σ
cons
−i ), f + 1 failures are detected. Clearly
the claim holds in this case. F2 consists of the failure patterns F
′ in F − F1 where the
message that i sent in Ii has no impact on the outcome; that is, either i crashes before
sending the message to j′ or no nonfaulty agent is reachable from j′ without i between
round m+1 and f +1. Let σ′i be identical to σi except that, at Ii, i replaces the reports
relative to j with SRi (the correct report) in messages sent to j
′, while sending the same
messages to other agents. Thus, i has fewer deviations with σ′i than with σi. Clearly,
conditional on R(Ii) ∩ R(F2), i gets the same expected utility with (σi, ~σ
cons
−i ) as with
(σ′i, ~σ
cons
−i ). It is easy to check that F2 satisfies the permutation assumption with respect
to Ii, so by the induction hypothesis, (3) holds conditional on R(Ii) ∩R(F2).
Let F3 consist of the remaining failure patterns in F . In runs of R(σi, ~σ
cons
−i ) ∩ R(Ii) ∩
R(F3), j
′ detects an inconsistency and decides ⊥ unless i guesses the random number
correctly. Again, it is not hard to check that F3 satisfies the permutation assumption
with respect to Ii. Since the largest utility that i can get if no inconsistency is detected
is β0i,
ui((σi, ~σ
cons
−i ) | R(Ii) ∩R(F3)) ≤
1
n
β0i +
n− 1
n
β2i.
On the other hand, by Lemma 1,
ui(~σ
cons | R(Ii) ∩R(F3)) ≥
1
n
β0i +
n− 1
n
β1i.
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Since β1i > β2i, we have
ui(~σ
cons | R(Ii) ∩R(F3)) ≥ ui((σi, ~σ
cons
−i ) | R(Ii) ∩R(F3)).
Therefore, (3) holds if m = 2.
Continuing with case (i), suppose that m > 2. Now it is possible that i pretending that
j did not crash can help even if j did not send a message to j′. Nevertheless, essentially
the same argument will work. This is because now SRi would have to include z
m−1
ji .
Moreover, zm−1ji [j
′] = zm−2j′j [j
′], the random number in {0, . . . , n − 1} sent by j′ to j in
round m− 2. Clearly, j′ knows this number, so i would have to guess it correctly. The
argument now proceeds as above.
Now consider case (ii). There are two ways in which i can ignore the information that
j′′ sent about j in round m− 1. The first is to pretend that j′′ crashed in round m− 1;
the second is for i to lie about the message that it received from j′′ (but to say that it
did get a message from j′′). In the first case, as with deviations of type 8, we can assume
without loss of generality that i does not know that j′′ is faulty at the beginning round
m. We partition F into three sets much as in the argument for case (i): F1, the failure
patterns in which more than f +1 failures are detected with σi; F2, the failure patterns
where i’s lie has no impact on the outcome; and F3, the remaining failure patterns.
Again, it is easy to see that (3) holds conditional on R(Ii) ∩R(F1) and R(Ii) ∩R(F2).
To see that (3) holds conditional on R(Ii)∩R(F3), we use the reachability assumption,
much as we did for as in (d) of the argument for deviations of type 1. By part 1 of the
reachability assumption, if i pretends that j′′ crashed in round m− 1, an inconsistency
will be detected with probability at least (2M − 1)/2M . Thus, the same argument as
that used in part (e) of the argument for deviations of type 1 shows that (3) holds
conditional on R(Ii) ∩R(F3).
The analysis is essentially the same if i lies about the message it received from j′′, except
that, conditional on R(Ii)∩R(F3), by the reachability assumption, j
′ receives the round
m−1 message from j′′ with probability at least (2M−1)/2M , so j′ receives inconsistent
reports about j’s status in round m− 1, and decides ⊥.
(b) Suppose that i lies to some j′ in round m by saying that j crashed at or before round m′
although i received a message from j in round m′ and either m′ = m− 1 or m′ < m− 1
and i did not receive a message from any agent saying that j crashed in round m′. If
m′ = m− 1, then we can proceed as in part (a). Specifically, we can use the reachability
assumption to show that i is better off if i does not lie.
The analysis is similar if i pretends to have received a message in round m − 1 from
some agent j′′ saying that j crashed in an earlier round. If i did not receive a message
from j′′ in round m− 1 saying that j crashed before m′ but is claiming to have done so,
then we can again use the same arguments as in part (a) where either i must guess the
random number zm−2j′j′′ [j
′] known by j′ (if j′′ did not send a round m − 1 message to i)
or i has to lie about the round m− 1 report of j′′.
(c) It is easy to see that i does not gain if i lies about which agent told him that j crashed
or about the values zm−1ji sent by j to i in round m − 1 (and may be worse off, if an
inconsistency is detected).
This completes the proof of the inductive step and, with it, the proof of the theorem.
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3.3 A π-Sequential Equilibrium for Fair Consensus
Our π-Nash equilibrium requires an agent i to decide on ⊥ whenever i detects a problem. While
this punishes the agent that causes the problem, it also punishes i. Would a rational agent actually
play such a punishment strategy? Note that the need to punish occurs only off the equilibrium
path; if all agents follow ~σcons , agents never decide ⊥. But to get agents to play according to ~σcons
requires the threat of playing ⊥. There might be a concern that this is an empty threat; a rational
agent might not be willing to play ⊥ if it detects a deviation.
The solution concept of sequential equilibrium (15) is a refinement of Nash equilibrium that,
roughly speaking, requires that agents also make best responses not only on the equilibrium path,
but off the equilibrium path as well. We now define π-sequential equilibrium, a generalization of
sequential equilibrium that allows for faulty agents (where, as before, π is a distribution on failure
contexts). We then show that ~σcons is essentially a π-sequential equilibrium.
3.3.1 Defining π-sequential equilibrium
Roughly speaking, a strategy profile ~σ is a sequential equilibrium if, for each agent i and
information set Ii for agent i, σi is a best response to ~σ−i conditional on reaching Ii (i.e. conditional
on R(Ii)). The problem is that the probability of R(Ii) is 0 if Ii is not on the equilibrium path, so
we cannot condition on R(Ii).
Define a belief system µ to be a function that associates with each agent i and information set
Ii for agent i a probability µIi on histories in Ii. Say that a belief system µ is consistent with ~σ and
π if there exists a sequence of completely mixed strategy profiles ~σ1, ~σ2, . . . (where a strategy profile
is completely mixed if it gives positive positive probability to every action at every information set)
converging to ~σ such that
µIi(h) = lim
M→∞
π~σM (h)
π~σM (Ii)
.
Note that µIi , π, and ~σ together define a probability distribution over runs in R(Ii). Let µIi,π,~σ
denote this probability distribution.
A pair (~σ, µ) is a π-sequential equilibrium if µ is a belief system consistent with ~σ and π such that,
for every agent i, information set Ii, and strategy σ
′
i, ui((σi, ~σ−i) | R(Ii)) ≥ ui((σ
′
i, ~σ−i) | R(Ii)),
where now the expected utility is taken with respect to µIi,π,~σ. (Kreps and Wilson’s (15) definition
of sequential equilibrium is identical, except that there is no distribution π on failure contexts.)
3.3.2 Extending ~σcons to a π-sequential equilibrium
We now show that the protocol ~σcons can be extended to a π-sequential equilibrium with minimal
changes. In the proof of Theorem 3, we showed that i could not gain by deviating at an information
set Ii where there were no deviations of type 1–9 prior to Ii. We did not show that i does not
gain from deviating at Ii if an inconsistency is detected at Ii, so that i is expected to decide ⊥.
In fact, if i believes that the inconsistency may go unnoticed by other agents due to crashes and
consensus may still be reached on some value in {0, 1}, then i always gains by not deciding ⊥.
However, suppose that µse is a belief system such that at an information set Ii for i that is off the
equilibrium path due to a deviation (or multiple deviations) from ~σcons by agents other than i, i
believes that these agents decided ⊥ when they deviated. (Intuitively, i believes that if the agents
were crazy enough to deviate in the first place, then they were also crazy enough to decide ⊥.) In
that case, deciding ⊥ is also a best response for i.
The belief system µse is not enough to deal with information sets Ii off the equilibrium path
due to i himself having deviated. Agent i cannot believe that it played ⊥ when it in fact did not.
To get a sequential equilibrium, we modify σconsi at information sets off the equilibrium path that
are reached due only to agent i’s deviations. Define the strategy σsei so that it agrees with σ
cons
i at
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every information set Ii where agent i has not deviated in the past. Thus, in particular, i decides
⊥ with σsei if i detects an inconsistency at one of these information sets. More generally, say that
an information set Ii is unsalvageable if i knows at Ii that another agent j deviated or detected an
inconsistency at a point when j had not crashed, and thus decided ⊥. Ii is certainly unsalvageable
if reaching Ii requires deviations by agents other than i (for then the agent that performed that
deviation decided ⊥). But even if i is the only agent who deviates at Ii, Ii may be unsalvageable.
For example, i does not send a message to j in round m1, i sends a message to j in round m2 > m1,
and then j sent a message to i in round m2+1, the round-(m2+2) information set where i receives
j’s message is also unsalvageable. If Ii is unsalvageable, i decides ⊥. Finally, if Ii is salvageable,
then at Ii agent i acts in a way that is most likely to have the other agents think that there has
been no inconsistency. In general, there may be more than one failure pattern that will prevent a
nonfaulty agent from realizing that there is an inconsistency. For example, if f = 1, n = 3, and
agent 1 did not send a message to agent 2 in round m, but did send a message to agent 3, then i
can either not send a message to any agent in round m+1, or it can send a message to agent 3. If
it is more likely that neither 2 nor 3 failed in roundm than agent 2 failed before telling agent 3 that
it did not hear from 1, then it would be better for i not to send a message to 2 or 3 in round m+1.
If there is more than one best response, then i chooses a fixed one according to some ordering on
actions. (Note that this means that, unlike ~σcons , the behavior of ~σse may depend on π.)
Having defined ~σse , we can now define µse formally. We assume that there are only finitely
many actions that i can play at each of its information sets Ii: it can send one of KIi possible
messages and/or decide one of ⊥, 0, or 1 if it has not yet made a decision, or do nothing. Given
an integer M > 0, let ~σM be the strategy profile where at each information set Ii, agent i plays
σsei (Ii) with probability 1 − 1/M , and divides the remaining probability 1/M over all the actions
that can be played at Ii as follows: if i has already decided before, then i sends each of the KIi
possible messages with equal probability 1
M(KIi+1)
and does nothing with probability 1
M(KIi+1)
; if
i has not yet decided at Ii, then for each of the KIi messages m that it can send, it decides ⊥ and
sends m with probability 1
M(KIi+1)
− 1
M2(KIi+1)
, decides ⊥ and sends no message with probability
1
M(KIi+1)
− 1
M2(KIi+1)
, and performs each of the remaining 3(KIi + 1) possible actions with equal
probability 13M2(KIi+1)
. Clearly ~σM is completely mixed and the sequence ~σM converges to ~σse .
Given a round-m information set Ii and global history h ∈ Ii, let
µseIi (h) = limM→∞
π~σM (h)
π~σM (Ii)
.
The effect of this definition of µseIi beliefs is that if Ii is off the equilibrium path as a result of some
other agent j’s deviation, then i believes that j played ⊥. Moreover, i believes that other agents j
have similar beliefs.
Theorem 4 shows that ~σse is a π-sequential equilibrium for a reasonable and uniform π.
Theorem 4. If f +1 < n, π is a distribution that supports reachability, is uniform, and allows up
to f failures, and agents care only about consensus, then (~σse , µse) is a π-sequential equilibrium.
Proof. Fix an agent i, a round-m information set Ii, and strategy σi. It is easy to see that µ
se is
consistent. Thus, it suffices to show that
ui((σ
se
i , ~σ
se
−i) | R(Ii)) ≥ ui((σi, ~σ
se
−i) | R(Ii)). (6)
We need to consider the cases where (a) Ii is consistent with ~σ
se , (b) Ii is inconsistent with ~σ
se
and unsalvageable, and (c) Ii is inconsistent with ~σ
se and salvageable. In case (a), σsei agrees
22
with σconsi ; the argument of the proof of Theorem 3 shows that it is a best response. In case (b),
the definition of µse guarantees that i ascribes probability 1 to whichever agent has deviated or
detected a deviation playing ⊥, so it is a best response for i to play ⊥. Finally, in case (c), for
failure patterns where some other agent j detects i’s deviation, i ascribes probability 1 to j playing
⊥, so it does not matter what i does. On the other hand, for failure patterns where all the nonfaulty
agents will consider it possible that there are no deviations, the proof of Theorem 3 shows that i
should continue to play in a way consistent with σconsi . If there are several choices of how to play
that might be consistent with σconsi , then i should clearly play one that is best.
4 Discussion
We have provided a strategy for consensus that is a π-Nash equilibrium and can be extended
to a π-sequential equilibrium, where π is a distribution on contexts that allows up to f failures and
satisfies minimal conditions, as long as n > f + 1. Although our argument is surprisingly compli-
cated, we have considered only the simplest possible case: synchronous systems, crash failures, and
only one player deviating (i.e., no coalitions). A small variant of our strategy also gives a Nash
and sequential equilibrium even if coalitions are allowed, but proving this seems significantly more
complicated. We are currently writing up the details carefully. Of course, things will get even
worse once we allow more general types of failures, such as omission failures and Byzantine failures.
But such failure types, combined with rational agents, are certainly of interest if we want to apply
consensus in, for example, financial settings of the type considered by Mazie`res (17). Consensus is
known to be impossible in an asynchronous setting, even with just one failure (9), but algorithms
that attain consensus with high probability are well known (e.g., (5)). We may thus hope to get
an ǫ–π-Nash equilibrium in the asynchronous setting if we also allow rational agents. We believe
that the techniques developed in this paper will be applicable to these more difficult problems.
It is also worth examining our assumptions regarding distributions in more detail. The unifor-
mity assumption implies that no agent is more likely to fail than any other. If all agents can be
identified with identical computers, then this seems quite reasonable. But if one agent can be iden-
tified with a computer that is known to be more prone to failure, then the uniformity assumption
no long holds. Note that the uniformity assumption does allow for correlated failures, just as long
as the permutation of a correlated failure is just as likely as the unpermuted version.
Now consider the assumption that π supports reachability. If we are considering Nash equilib-
rium (where there is only one deviating agent), the assumption says that the probability, conditional
on an information set Ii (and some assumptions about failures), that some information (about a
message sent by an agent that crashes or about the fact that an agent crashed in a particular
round) is quite high, where “quite high” is a function of the number of agents M that are nonfaulty
according to Ii. Since the more nonfaulty agents there are, the more likely it is that an agent l 6= i
is reachable from j without i.
However, once we allow coalitions K of agents, it becomes less likely that l /∈ K is reachable
from j without K with probability 1/2M , not taking K into account. To take an extreme example,
suppose that |K| = k, f = 1, and n = k + 2. Now suppose that i receives a message from agent
j′′ in round 3 that some other agent j, from whom i got a round 1 message, crashed in round 1.
Further suppose that round 1 would be considered clean if j did not crash in round 1 and that i’s
utility would be higher if round 1 is considered clean rather than a later round. Thus, it may be to
i’s benefit not to forward j’s message; if j in fact crashes without any nonfaulty agent hearing j’s
message, i will be better off. Since all the agents in K can coordinate in not forwarding j’s message,
j’s message will reach a nonfaulty agent only if either j is nonfaulty, or j crashes either after round
2 or crashes at round 2, but still sends a message to the nonfaulty agent that is not in K before
crashing. Since M = n in this case, this means that j’s message must reach a nonfaulty agent with
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probability at least 2n−12n =
4k+3
4k+4 , independent of k. For small k, this seems quite reasonable; for
large k, it does not. This suggests that this assumption is appropriate if k+f is not a large fraction
of n.
Our final comment concerns the fairness assumption. While this assumption distinguishes our
work from some of the other related work (e.g., (3; 6)), since, as we observed above, a consensus
protocol must essentially implement a randomized dictatorship, achieving fairness once we get
consensus in the presence of rational and faulty agents is not that difficult; we must simply ensure
that the rational agents cannot affect the probability of a particular agent being selected as dictator.
We enforce this using appropriate randomization in our protocol. The requirement in (6) that
consensus must be achieved no matter what the deviating agents do turns out to have far more
impact on the technical results than the fairness requirement.
In any case, we believe that the need for dealing with both rational and faulty agents in consensus
protocols is compelling. There is clearly much more to be done on this problem.
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Algorithm 1 σconsi (vi): i’s consensus protocol with initial value vi
1: decided ← false
2: STi ← {(i, vi)}
3: z ← random in {0 . . . n− 1}
4: for all j 6= i do
5: SR1i [j] ← (∞,⊥) ⊲ All agents are initially active
6: for all l 6= j, i do
7: z1ij [l] ← 0
8: z1ij [i] ← random in {0 . . . n− 1} ⊲ Random number to be used by j in round 2
9: z1ij [j] ← z ⊲ Proves that i sends round 1 message to j
10: for all 0 ≤ t ≤ f do
11: xi[t] ← random in {0, . . . , n− t− 1} ⊲ A random number for each possible value of t
12: qti ← random polynomial of degree 1 with q
t
i(0) = xi[t]
13: for all j 6= i do
14: yij [t] ← qti(j)
15: for all round 1 ≤ m ≤ f + 1 such that ¬decided do
16: Phase 1: send phase
17: for all j 6= i do
18: if m = 1 then Send 〈vi, SRmi , (y
0
ij , . . . , y
f
ij), z
m
ij 〉 to j
19: if 2 ≤ m ≤ f then Send 〈SRmi , z
m
ij 〉 to j
20: if m = f + 1 then Send 〈SRmi , (y
0
li
, . . . , y
f
li
)l 6=j〉 to j
21: EndPhase
22: Phase 2: receive phase
23: SRm+1i ← SR
m
i
24: for all j 6= i do
25: if receive valid message from j then
26: if m = 1 then STi ← STi ∪ {(j, vj)} ⊲ STi contains all the values that i has seen
27: SRm+1i [j]← (∞, z
m
ji ) ⊲ Note that j is still active
28: for all l 6= i, j do
29: if SRmj [l] = (m
′, j′) and SRmi [l] = (m
′′, j′′) and m′ < m′′ then
30: SRm+1i [l]← (m
′, j) ⊲ l crashed earlier than previously thought
31: zm+1
il
[j]← ⊥
32: else if SRmj [l] = (∞, z
m
j ) then
33: zm+1
il
[j] = zmji [j]
34: else if SRm+1
i
[j] = (∞, z′) for some z′ then
35: SRm+1i [j]← (m, i) ⊲ i detects a crash of j
36: for all l 6= i do
37: zm+1
il
[j]← ⊥
38: EndPhase
39: Phase 3: update phase
40: if an inconsistency is detected then
41: Decide(⊥) ⊲ Punishment
42: decided ← true
43: else if m ≤ f then
44: for all j 6= i do
45: zm+1ij [i] ← random in {0, . . . , n− 1}
46: else if decided = false then
47: NC0 = N
48: for all 1 ≤ m′ ≤ f + 1 do
49: NCm′ ← {j ∈ N − {i} | ∀m
′′ ≤ m′, l(SRf+2i [j] 6= (m
′′, l)) ∪ {i} ⊲ Agents that did not crash up to round m′
50: m∗ ← first round m′ such that NCm′ = NCm′−1 ⊲ First round that seems clean
51: t ← n− |NCm∗ | ⊲ Number of crashes prior to m∗
52: for all j ∈ NCm∗ do
53: qtj ← unique polynomial interpolating the values y
t
jl
received ⊲ otherwise, an inconsistency was detected
54: xj [t]← qtj(0)
55: S ←
∑
j∈NC
m
∗
xj [t] mod (n− t) ⊲ Calculate a random number in 0, . . . , n− t− 1
56: Decide(vj ), where j is the (S + 1)st highest id in NCm∗
57: EndPhase
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